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JURISDICTION
A final judgment was issued by the district court on March 25, 2016. (R. at 3966).
On April 8, 2016, appellants moved the district comt for a new trial pursuant to Utah Rule
(j

of Civil Procedure 59(a)(6). (R. at 3971). The district court denied the appellants' motion
on May 31, 2016. (R. at 4091 ). Appellants subsequently appealed the final judgment to
the Utah Supreme Court by timely filing a Notice of Appeal with the district court on June
27, 2016. (R. at 4093). On July 5, 2016, the Utah Supreme Court assigned the appeal to
the Utah Court of Appeals. (R. at 4106} Therefore, this Court has jurisdiction over the
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann.§ 78A-4-103(2)G).

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Whether the district court erred when it held that the jury's initial special

verdict form, in which the jury determined both that (a) the defendants had breached the
relevant contract, and (b) a mutual mistake existed between the parties at the time the
contract was signed, was so inconsistent that it required the jury to reconvene and complete
a second special verdict form to correct the perceived inconsistency. (R. at 2569; 3898, p.
328). In reviewing a trial court's decision regarding the consistency of a jury verdict,
appellate courts resolve any inconsistencies in favor of giving effect to the jury verdict.

Neffv. Neff, 2011 UT 6, 1149, 76,247 P.3d 380.
2.

Whether the district court erred when it denied appellants' Motion for New

Trial based on the insufficiency of evidence where the jury awarded consequential damages

6
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to plaintiff primarily based on costs incurred by a non-party entity. (R. at 4091). The
standard of review for a trial court's denial of a motion for new trial based on the
insufficiency of evidence is whether the evidence at trial, when viewed in the light most
favorable to the prevailing party, was insufficient to support the verdict. Crookston v. Fire
Ins. Exchange, 817 P.2d 789, 799 {Utah 1991).
PERTINENT STATUTES AND RULES

Rule 59. New trial; altering or amending a judgment.
(a) Grounds. Except as limited by Rule 61, a new trial may be granted to any party on any
issue for any of the following reasons:
*
*
*
(a)(6) insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision;

*

*

*

(b) Time for motion. A motion for a new trial must be filed no later than 28 days after
entry of the judgment.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

I.

COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE DISTRICT COURT

This case commenced on October 1, 2010, when plaintiff KTM Health Care, Inc.
("KTM") filed a complaint against SG Nursing Home, LLC dba Kolob Care and
Rehabilitation of St. George ("Ko lob"). (R. at 1). The complaint alleged that Ko lob had
failed to honor a contract it had signed with KTM pursuant to which KTM was to provide
pharmacy goods and services to Kolob's nursing home residents. (Id.). KTM subsequently
filed an amended complaint on February 2, 2011. (R. at 35). The amended complaint was
based on the same set of underlying facts, but added additional causes of action, including

7
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lll

claims for (i) breach of contract, (ii) promissory estoppel/detrimental reliance, (iii)
negligence, (iv) fraud in the inducement, (v) constructive fraud, (vi) intentional
misrepresentation, and (vii) negligent misrepresentation. (Id.).
On April 25, 2012, KTM filed a second amended complaint for the purpose of
adding an additional defendant, Apex Health Care Solutions, Inc. ("Apex"). (R. at 292).
Specifically, KTM alleged that Apex was Kolob's "parent company" and that it was
therefore liable to KTM for damages under theories of alter ego, agency, joint venture and
respondeat superior. (Id.). The claims against Kol ob remained the same. (Id.). Ko lob and
Apex subsequently filed answers to the second amended complaint in which they asserted,
inter alia, that KTM's claims "are barred, in whole or in part, based on a mutual mistake."
(R. at 402, 426).

At the conclusion of discovery, Kolob filed various dispositive motions seeking to
dismiss KTM's claims for negligence, fraud and misrepresentation. The court ultimately
granted many of these motions. (R. at 1176, 2324). Pursuant to these rulings, the only
claims remaining for trial were KTM's claim for breach of contract, as well as the related
vicarious liability claims against Apex. (Id.).
The district court conducted a jury trial on KTM's remaining claims on October 2730, 2014. (R. at 3895-98). During trial, and in response to KTM's breach of contract
claim, Kolob re-asserted the affinnative defense of mutual mistake. (R. at 3898, p. 199205; 2528). On October 30, 2014, the parties' claims and defenses were submitted to the

8
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Jury. After several hours of deliberation, the jury completed a Special Verdict Form and
announced that it had reached a verdict on the parties' claims and defenses. (R. at 25452553; 3898, p. 322-325). Specifically, the jury found that Kolob had breached the relevant
contract and that KTM had suffered "lost profits" in the amount of $143,989.00, plus
"attorney fees." (Id.). The jury expressly stated that it was not awarding any consequential
damages to KTM. (Id). At the same time, the jury also found that Kolob had successfully
proven its mutual mistake defense by clear and convincing evidence. (Id).
After the jury's verdict was announced, the district court raised what it perceived to
be an inconsistency in the jury's verdict. (R. at 3898, p. 326). Specifically, the district
court believed that it was inconsistent for the jury both to rule in Kolob's favor on its
"mutual mistake" defense and to award damages to KTM. (R. at 3898, p. 326-27). In
response, Ko lob argued that the jury's verdict should be enforced because it was not
inconsistent.

(R. at 3898, p. 328).

Specifically, Kolob argued that since the jury

determined that the parties were mutually mistaken as to an important fact at the time the
contract was signed, the contract was unenforceable as a matter of law. (Id.). Therefore,
the jury's damage award was advisory only and could not be enforced by the court. (Id.).
As such, Kolob argued that the district court should enter a judgment that dismissed KTM's
claims in their entirety pursuant to the jury's finding on the defense of mut1:1aI mistake.

(Id.).

9
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The district court ultimately overruled the defendants' objections and held that it
was necessary to re-submit the case to the jury so that it could clarify the perceived
inconsistency. (R. at 3898, p. 326-27). In doing so, the court instructed the jury that it
must either uphold Kolob's mutual mistake defense or award damages to KTM, but that
the jury was not permitted to do both. (Id.).
When it re-submitted the case to the jury, the district court also addressed the jury's
previous statement regarding an award of "attorney fees." (Id.). Specifically, the court
instructed the jury that because the relevant contract did not contain any provisions
regarding attorney's fees KTM was not entitled to recover any attorney's fees in this case.
4j

(Id).

After receiving the case again from the district court, the jury considered and
completed a Second Special Verdict Form. (R. at 2554). In the Second Special Verdict
Form, the jury reversed its previous finding regarding mutual mistake and found that there
was no mutual mistake between the parties. (Id.). The Second Special Verdict Form did
not award attorney's fees. However, the jury increased its previous damage award by
awarding KTM $120,000 in "consequential damages" in addition to its previous lost profit
award. (Id).
On November 20, 2014, and prior to the entry of final judgment, Kolob and Apex
moved the district court to reconsider its decision that the jury's first special verdict form
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was inconsistent. (R. at 2569). The court ultimately denied this motion. (R. at 2698). The
court subsequently issued a final judgment on March 25, 2016. (R. at 3966).
On April 8, 2016, Kol ob and Apex moved the district court for a new trial pursuant
to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a)(6). (R. at 3971). Specifically, Kolob and Apex
argued that there was insufficient evidence to support the $120,000 consequential damages
award contained in the jury's Second Special Verdict Form. The district court denied this
motion for new trial on May 31, 2016. (R. at 4091). Kolob and Apex subsequently
appealed the final judgment by timely filing a Notice of Appeal with the district court on
June 27, 2016. (R. at 4093).
II.

STATEMENTOFRELEVANTFACTS
A.

Background

Adam Katschke is a licensed pharmacist who has worked at and operated
pharmacies since 2000. (R. at 3896, p.114). In August 2009, Mr. Katschke and his
business partner, Lane Truman, formed KTM Healthcare Solutions, Inc. ("KTM"). (Id. at
p.117). The company soon opened a retail pharmacy in Enterprise, Utah, known as
Enterprise Valley Pharmacy ("Enterprise Valley"). (Id).
At the time KTM was formed, Mr. Katschke also owned and operated another retail
pharmacy in Caliente, Nevada, known as Meadow Valley Pharmacy ("Meadow Valley").
(Id. at p.116-17). However, KTM and Meadow Valley are completely separate entities

that have separate organizational documents. (Id. at p.223-224). They have separate tax
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ID numbers and they maintain separate books and records. (Id.). Moreover, KTM and
Meadow Valley do not have identical ownership. While Mr. Katschke is the sole owner
of Meadow Valley, he co-owns KTM with Mr. Truman. (Id.).
Approximately four months after KTM started its operations, a decision was made
to begin operating the pharmacy as a "closed-door" pharmacy instead of as a retail
pharmacy. (Id. at p.123). A closed-door pharmacy is significantly different than a retail
pharmacy because it is not open to the general public. (Id. at p.119). Rather, a closed-door
pharmacy provides services to a defined and exclusive group of patients, such as long-term
care facilities, skilled nursing facilities and assisted living communities.

(Id.).

The

advantage of operating a closed-door pharmacy is that the pharmacy receives certain
manufacturer rebates that are not available to retail pharmacies. (Id.). A closed-door
pharmacy is also able to charge insurance companies, a higher dispensing fee for its
~

services. (Id at p. 119-20).
B.

Negotiations Between Kolob and KTM.

Ko lob Care and Rehabilitation of St. George ("Kol ob"), is a skilled nursing facility
located in St. George, Utah. The facility provides short term and long term rehabilitation
services for patients who are recovering from surgery, diseases, accidents, dementia, etc..
(R. at 294 ). Kol ob requires and makes use of pharmaceutical products and services on a

daily basis in order to provide proper care for its residents. (Id.).

Apex Healthcare

12
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Solutions, LLC, ("Apex") is a management company whose employees had supervisory
authority over Kolob and its operations. (R. at 3895, p.238-40). 1
In December 2009, KTM contacted Kolob to see whether Kolob had any interest in
contracting with KTM for its pharmaceutical needs. (Id at p.123). At the time, Kolob
already had a contract with another closed-door pharmacy known as Superior Care
Pharmacy ("Superior Care") to fill its residents' prescriptions. (R. at 3895, Tr. Exhibit 23;

3 896, p.45). However, KTM was having service issues with Superior Care at the time.
(R. at 3896, p.48).
After Kolob expressed interest in using KTM's services, Mr. Katschke had a
meeting in January 20_10 with Kolob's administrator, Jerry Olson, and its regional manager,
Greg Seeger. 2 (Id. at p.125). During this meeting, Kolob expressed "great" interest and
eventually told Mr. Katschke: "you put something together, we would like to see it, we
would like to work with you." (Id.at p.126).

Mr. Katschke next held a meeting regarding KTM's services with Mr. Olson and
Mr. Seeger on March 23, 2010. (Id. at p.127). During this meeting, Kolob stated that it

Kol ob and Apex are not appealing the jury's determination that Apex can be held
liable for Kolob's breach of contract. Therefore, the precise relationship between Kolob
and Apex will not be examined herein in full. However, if this Court ultimately determines
that Kolob is not liable for breach of contract, then Apex obviously cannot be held liable
to KTM for any damages.
1

Greg Seeger was technically an employee of Apex who was responsible for the
management of Ko lob and its employees.
2

13
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was very unhappy with Superior Care's services. (Id). Specifically, it stated that its nurses
had been yelled at by the Superior Care pharmacist and that it was having other service
issues as well. (Id.). Kolob then stated "we are ready to use your services" and "[w]e know
you'll be a great service." (Id.). However, Kolob wanted to be assured that Mr. Katschke
would be the pharmacist in charge of servicing Ko lob, as opposed to some other employee.
(Id). In response, Mr. Katschke promised that he would personally work at the KTM

pharmacy in order to service Ko lob's residents. (Id.).
No contract was actually signed during the aforementioned meeting. (Id at 130).
Rather, Kolob asked KTM draw up a contract and provide it with some "proofs" to review.
(Id.). Mr. Katschke then took a tour of Kolob's facility and had some cookies with Mr.

Seeger and Mr. Olson. (Id.). The parties then congratulated each other regarding their new
business venture. (Id).
At the time of the March 23, 2010 meeting, Mr. Katschke was not personally
working at the KTM pharmacy. Rather, he was working at his other separately owned
pharmacy, Meadow Valley. Therefore, Mr. Katschke believed he needed to hire another
pharmacist to fill his position at Meadow Valley. (Id at p.127-28). On April 17, 2010,
Meadow Valley signed an employment contract with a pharmacist named Trent Decker to
take over Mr. Katschke's position. (Id. at p.136, 204; Tr. Exhibit 84). The contract had a
three-year term beginning May 1, 2010 and provided Mr. Decker a $120,000 annual salary
with benefits. (Id). However, Mr. Decker's employment contract with Meadow Valley

14
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made no mention of KTM, and Mr. Decker never did any work whatsoever for KTM. (Id.
at p.277-78).
In order for KTM to become licensed to operate as a closed-door pharmacy, it
needed to incur certain expenses to comply with pertinent state and federal regulations.
(Id. at p.185). For example, it needed to install new shelving, countertops, alarm system

and refrigeration equipment. (Id. at p.186). It needed to buy a new computer and software
system. (Id.). It also incurred costs related to licensing, training and third-party insurance
contracting. (Id.). In total, KTM incurred $33,302.54 in order to prepare itself to operate
as a closed-door pharmacy. (Id. at p.186; Tr. Exhibit 34). However, KTM incurred all of
these costs prior to signing any contract withKolob. (Id. atp.224-227; 231-240; Tr. Exhibit
34). For example, most of the build-out and construction was performed between January
and April 2010 and the computers were purchased in early May 2010. (Id.).
Kolob's regional manager, Greg Seeger, testified that after Kolob's meeting with
KTM in March 2010, he reviewed what he believed to be KTM' s existing pharmaceutical
contract with Superior Care to review the termination clause. (Id. at p.49). He also spoke
with the local Superior Care representative to discuss whether Kolob would be able to
terminate its existing contract and begin using KTM as its new provider. (Id.). Based on
these discussions, Kolob was under the impression that its existing agreement with
Superior Care was on a month-to-month basis and could be terminated with 30-days'
notice. (R. at 3895, p.136).

15
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After the March 23, 2010 meeting, Mr. Seeger called Mr. Katschke to state that he
had received a pricing proposal from Superior Care and that he wanted to know if KTM
could beat their offer. (R. at 3896, p.272-74). On April 15, 2010, Mr. Seeger followed up
by sending Mr. Katschke an email that contained Superior Care's pricing proposal. (Id. at
p.269, Ex. 43). Based on this email, Mr. Katschke figured out that Kolob prob~bly had an
existing contract with Superior Care. (Id. at p.270-71). Mr. Katschke also assumed that
Kolob would be able to get out of its existing pharmaceutical contract prior to using KTM
for its pharmaceutical services. (R. at 3897, p. 6).
On May 25, 2010, Mr. Katschke had another meeting with Mr. Olson to discuss the
proposed contract between Kolob and KTM. (R. at 3896, p.146). Mr. Seeger participated
by telephone. (Id.). The parties were there to discuss a proposed draft contract that Mr.
Katschke had sent to KTM previously. Mr. Olson did have some suggested changes to the
Ci)

contract, which Mr. Katschke incorporated immediately using his laptop. (Id.).

Mr.

Katschke then printed out the contract and faxed it over to Mr. Seeger, who proceeded to
sign it and fax it back to Mr. Katschke. (Id. at 146-47).
The relevant contract states that "the term of this agreement shall be from June 28,
2010 to June 27, 2011." (R. at 3895, Tr. Exhibit 1). Mr. Seeger testified that the reason
this start date was chosen was to allow KTM to have at least thirty-days to notify Superior
Care of its decision to cancel its existing pharmaceutical contract and to start using KTM
as its pharmacy. (R. at 3896, p. 50).

16
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C.

Post-Contract Developments

On the same day KTM and Kolob signed their contract, Kolob's administrator Jerry
Olson either emailed or called Superior Care's local manager, Steve Woods, to let him
know that Kolob would no longer be using Superior Care for its pharmaceutical needs. (R.
at 3895, p.131-32). Mr. Woods responded by stating that Kolob's contract was still in
effect and that Kolob was not entitled to terminate it in the next thirty days. (Id. at p.132).
After learning that Superior Care was disputing Kolob's ability to switch pharmacy
providers, Mr. Olson sent the following email to Mr. Katschke on May 25, 2010, the day
after the relevant Agreement had been signed:
Hi Adam,
Superior is g1vmg us some trouble. They are disagreeing with our
interpretation of the contract and they are saying that we are locked in for
five more months. We disagree with them and think we should be able to
give 30 days' notice. I hope it can all be worked out quickly so we can move
forward as planned.
However, please hold off on ordering any med carts for now. If we have
to stick with them for longer than expected I would hate to have you on the
hook for some new med carts.
I think we can get this resolved within a day or two. I'm going to be speaking
with Greg [Seeger] about it tomorrow and if necessary, our attorney.
I knew they wouldn't like it.
I' 11 be in touch with you soon.
Jerry Olson
(R. at 3895, Tr. Exhibit 2) (emphasis in original).

17
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Qi

Mr. Seeger testified that on approximately May 28, 2010, he had a discussion with
someone at Superior Care regarding Kolob's ability to terminate its contract with thirty
days' notice. (R. at 3896, p.62). Mr. Seeger testified that his previous determination was
in error because it was based on the wrong contract. As Mr. Seeger testified at trial:
What I recollect though is that Jerry and I had reviewed the [Superior Care]
contract, came up with the termination date. But then again ·as I recall when
we notified the local branch, Superior Pharmacy, then a few days later
another branch or individual within [Superior Care] said actually there's a
different contract. And, again, you know, as I recall, we came up with the
termination date at the facility, at Kolob Care, and then as I recall three days
later we were notified by some other individual within [Superior Care], no,
here's the contract. And as I recall it was a different agreement than what we
were working with at the facility.

(Id at p.62).
On June 7, 2010, Mr. Olson sent another email to Mr. Katschke regarding Kolob's
situation with Superior Care:
Greg [Seeger] asked me to let you know that apparently we are not going to
be able to get out of our contract with [Superior Care] until the end of
October. I don't know exactly the details because Greg is handling it, but
Greg is going to be here later this week and I'm sure we will be discussing
our pharmacy situation.
I'm sorry I have to deliver this bad news. We like you and would like to do
business with you but right now it looks like we don't have much of a choice
other than to take a step back, at least for awhile.
(R. at 3895, Tr. Exhibit 4).
At trial, Mr. Katschke testified that Kolob did not intentionally enter into a contract
with KTM with knowledge that it would be unable to get out of its Superior Care contract.
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(Id at 3896, p.191). Rather, he stated that the decision to sign the KTM contract "was a

big mistake." (Id). As Mr. Olson explained at trial:
I would not do that -- I would not try to - that would be unethical, number
one. Number two, in St. George this is a small community, and when you're
working in Kol ob Care & Rehab for eight-and-a-half years like I worked over
there, kind of the reputation of the facility becomes synonymous with your
personal reputation. So for me to -- I think there's maybe five or six nursing
homes in this county, and to be able to look for other employment, if I ever
wanted to start my own business, or even just if I was to remain there and try
and build that business as I did for eight-and-a-half years, my personal
reputation is important to me, and I would not sign a contract knowingly or
unknowingly to leverage a few bucks out of another vendor.
(Id. at p.170-71).

On July 11, 2010, Mr. Olson sent another email to Mr. Katschke in which he
confirmed that KTM would not be using Kolob as its pharmaceutical provider pursuant to
the parties' contract:
Adam, we have decided to stick with Superior Care for at least another year.
It was not an easy decision but it was one made jointly between Greg, Bess
and myself.
I hope that you are successful in finding a long term care client or two here
in town. I think competition is healthy for everyone in the market. Our
company always tries to retain good relationships with our vendors and
business partners and I hope we can retain a good relationship with you.
(Id. at Tr. Exhibit 5).

In light of Kolob's decision not to use KTM as its pharmacy, Mr. Katschke never
began working as KTM's pharmacist as he previously intended to do. As a result, KTM
was never required to pay him a salary as its pharmacist. As Mr. Katschke testified at trial:
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~

Q.

The question, sir, was it was your intent if the contract [between KTM
and Kol ob] went through to ... leave Meadow Valley and begin working over
atKTM?
A.
As I was needed, yes.
Q.
And you would have paid yourself for the work - KTM would have
paid for the work you performed?
A.
That's correct.
Q.
Since the contract didn't go through, you never actually went over
there to perform any work at KTM?
A.
That's right. I was without a job, if you will.
Q.
So therefore KTM avoided that cost of having to pay you as a result
of the contract not going through. That was a cost that KTM avoided?
A.
Sure.

(Id. at p.248-49).
Around the time Kolob notified KTM that it was not going to use KTM as its
pharmaceutical provider, KTM was also meeting with another nursing facility in St.
George, Hurricane Health & Rehabilitation ("Hurricane"), regarding a potential pharmacy
service contract. (R. at 3896, p.54-56). However, Hurricane never signed a contract with
KTM and it eventually stopped taking KTM's calls. (Id. at p.57-58). Mr. Katschke
testified that he does not know why he was unable to ultimately obtain this contract with
Hurricane. (Id. at p.55).

D.

Trial and Jury Verdict

The district conducted a trial in this matter on October 27-30, 2014, during which a
jury heard KTM's claim for breach of contract against defendants Kolob and Apex. (R. at
3895-98). Specifically, KTM claimed that Kolob breached the relevant pharmaceutical
agreement when Kolob decided it was not going to use KTM as its pharmacy provider in
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June 2010. Kolob also argued that Apex was liable for Kolob's breach because Apex was
acting as Kolob's parent company when the breach occurred. (Id). In response to KTM's
claims, Kolob and Apex asserted the affirmative defense of mutual mistake. (R. at 3898,
p.199-205; 2528). The basis for this defense was that Kolob and KTM were mutually
mistaken as to Kolob's ability to terminate its pharmacy provider agreement with Superior
Care prior to the time Kolob was to begin using KTM as its pharmacy. (R. at 3898, p.199-

205)
At the conclusion of the parties' closing arguments, the case was given to the jury.
The district court also provided a Special Verdict Form to the jury that was to be answered
by the jury as part of its deliberations. (R. at 2545). After several hours of deliberation,
the jury completed its Special Verdict Form and announced that it had reached a verdict on
the parties' claims and defenses. In sum, the jury found that Kolob had breached the
relevant contract and that KTM had suffered lost profits in the amount of $143,989.00, plus
"attorney fees." (Id.). At the same time, the jury found that Kolob has successfully proven
its defense of mutual mistake. (Id.). This was stated in the jury's Special Verdict Form as
follows:

Formation and Breach:
1) After weighing the evidence presented to you, do you find by a
preponderance of the evidence that Defendant Kolob entered into a contract
with Plaintiff KTM?

Yes_x__

No_
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If you answered "yes," please proceed to question #2 ....
2) Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that Defendant Kolob
breached the contract you have determined that Defendant Kolob entered
into with Plaintiff KTM?
Yes_x_

No_

If you answered "yes," please proceed to ·Question #3 ....
3) Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that Defendant Kol ob
breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing?
(ib

Yes_x_

No_

If you answered "yes" to either question #2 or question #3, please
proceed to question #4 ....
Kolob's Affirmative Defense (Mutual Mistake):

4) Do you find by the heightened evidentiary standard of clear and
convincing evidence that Defendant Kol ob' s ability to terminate its contract
with [Superior Care] was a basic assumption, or an important fact, upon
which both Plaintiff KTM and Defendant Kolob had knowledge and upon
which Plaintiff KTM and Defendant Kol ob based their contract?
Yes_x_

No_

If you answered "yes," please proceed to the next question ....

G;j

5) Do you find by the heightened standard of clear and convincing evidence
that at the time the contract was formed between Plaintiff KTM and
Defendant Kolob, both Plaintiff KTM and Defendant Kolob were mistaken
regarding Defendant Kolob's ability to terminate its contract with [Superior
Care] prior to the date of the performance of the contract?
Yes__K_

No

*

*

*
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Damages:
10) Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that K1M suffered
damages as a result of Defendant Kolob's breach of the contract, or breach
of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing?
Yes_x_

No_

If you answered "yes," please proceed to the question #11 ....
11) What is the amount of lost profits Plaintiff KTM suffered as a result of
Defendant Kol ob' s breach of contract?
$ 143,989

Please proceed to question #12.
12) Did Plaintiff KTM suffer any additional losses reasonably anticipated
within the contemplation of the parties?
Yes_

No_K

If you answered "yes," please proceed to the question # 13. If you
answered "no" please proceed to question # 14 without answering question
#13.
13) What is the amount of additional damages KTM suffered?
$ [ space left blank]

14) Please sum your answers from question #11 and question #13 to
determine Plaintiff KTM' s total damage award.
Lost Profits (question #11)
143,989
Consequential Damages (question #13)
0
Total Damage Award ·
$ 143,989

plus attorney fees[ 3 ]

(R. at 2545-2553; 3898, p.322-325).

3

The phrase "plus attorney fees" was handwritten by the jury on the verdict form.
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After the jury's verdict was announced, the district court raised what it perceived to
be an inconsistency in the jury's verdict. (R. at 3898, p. 326). Specifically, the district
court believed that it was inconsistent for the jury both to rule in Kolob's favor on its
"mutual mistake" defense and to award damages to KTM. (R. at 3898, p. 326-27). The
court therefore determined that it was necessary to re-submit the case to the jury so that it
could clarify the perceived inconsistency. (R. at 3898, p. 326-27). In doing so, the court
instructed the jury that it must either uphold Kolob's mutual mistake defense or award
damages to KTM, but that it was not permitted to do both. (Id). The district court also
addressed the portion of the jury's verdict regarding an award of "attorney fees." (Id.).
Specifically, the court instructed the jury that KTM was not entitled to recover any
attorney's fees in this case because the relevant contract did not contain any provisions
regarding attorney's fees. (Id). As the court stated to the jury:
Folks, perhaps because the verdict form was not plain enough, there
are inconsistencies here. I want to explain them to you. I don't think that it
would take you long, but I'm going to ask you to go back, and it really
shouldn't take long.
You have found that there's been a breach of the contract. An
affirmative defense to the breach of contract is mutual mistake, and you
found that there was mutual mistake. If there was a mutual mistake made,
then there was no contract. It never formed, and so you couldn't award
damages. And_ rather than have this go up on appeal with that instruction, I
would like you to go back and consider if, in fact, you found by clear and
convincing evidence that there was mutual mistake based on Questions 4 and
5, then you can't find a contract and find damages. As a matter of fact, the
only time attorney's fees can be awarded is if it's in the contract or if there's
a statute. There was no statute that would be involved, and if you read -- and
I'm sure that you did -- the contract did not have an attorney's fees clause. If
there had been one, we would have been arguing about it and about the
24
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amount. And since it's not, your suggestion here plus attorney's fees is also I
guess as a matter of law I can't do that.

(Id at p.326).
After receiving the case again from the court, the jury deliberated and completed a
Gil
Second Special Verdict Form. (R. at 2554). In doing so, the jury reversed its previous
finding regarding mutual mistake and found that there was no mutual mistake between the
parties. (Id). In addition, the jury increased its previous damage award by awarding KTM
an additional $120,000 in "consequential damages." (Id). As stated in the Second Special
Verdict Form:

Formation and Breach:
1) After weighing the evidence presented to you, do you find by a
preponderance of the evidence that Defendant Ko lob entered into a contract
with Plaintiff KTM?
Yes_x_

No- -

If you answered "yes," please proceed to question #2 ....

2) Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that Defendant Kolob
breached the contract you have determined that Defendant Kolob entered
into with Plaintiff KTM?
Yes_x_

No_

If you answered "yes," please proceed to Question #3 ....

3) Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that Defendant Kolob
breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing?
Yes_JL

No_
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If you answered "yes" to either question #2 or question #3, please
proceed to question #4 ....
Kolob's Affirmative Defense (Mutual Mistake):

4) Do you find by the heightened evidentiary standard of clear and
convincing evidence that Defendant Kol ob' s ability to terminate its contract
with [Superior Care] was a basic assumption, or an important fact, upon
which both Plaintiff KTM and Defendant Kolob had knowledge and upon
which Plaintiff KTM and Defendant Kol ob based their contract?
Yes_

No_K

*

*

*

Damages:

10) Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that KTM suffered
damages as a result of Defendant Ko lob's breach of the contract, or breach
of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing?
Yes_x_
No_
If you answered "yes," please proceed to the question #11 ....
11) What is the amount of lost profits Plaintiff KTM suffered as a result of
Defendant Kolob's breach of contract?
$ 143.989.00

Please proceed to question #12.
12) Did Plaintiff KTM suffer any additional losses reasonably anticipated
within the contemplation of the parties?
Yes_x_

No_

If you answered "yes," please proceed to the question #13. If you
answered "no" please proceed to question # 14 without answering question
#13.
13) What is the amount of additional damages KTM suffered?
~
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$ 120,000.00

14) Please sum your answers from question #11 and question #13 to
determine Plaintiff KTM' s total damage award.
Lost Profits (question #11)
Consequential Damages (question # 13)
Total Damage Award

143,989.00
120,000.00
$ 263,989.00

(R. at 2554-2562).

The district court ultimately upheld the jury's Second Special Verdict Form in its
entirety over the objections of counsel for Kolob and Apex. (R. at 2698).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

Ko lob and Apex respectfully request this Court to reverse the district court's ruling
that the jury's First Special Verdict Form was so inconsistent that it needed to be
resubmitted to the jury. When reviewing special verdict forms, Utah courts must not
presume inconsistency, but rather have a duty to reconcile verdicts whenever possible. In
this case, the jury's finding that a mutual mistake existed between the parties can certainly
be reconciled with its damage award. This is because a mutual mistake does not go to the
creation of a contract. Rather, it addresses the enforceability of an otherwise valid contract.
The jury's determination that KTM suffered damages has no bearing on whether the
contract is enforceable. Rather, enforceability is a legal conclusion that courts must make
based on the jury's factual findings. In this case, once the jury made a factual finding that
there was a mutual mistake between the parties when the contract was made, the district
court was obligated to rule that the parties' contract was unenforceable.
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Gj

Even if this Court determines that the jury's decision to award damages was
inconsistent with its finding of mutual mistake, it should at least reverse the district court's
decision to award KTM the amount of damages identified in the Second Special Verdict
Form, which was $120,000 greater than the award in the first Special Verdict Form. This
is because there was no inconsistency regarding the amount of damages in jury's first
verdict. As such, there was no legal basis to allow the jury to reconsider the amount of
(fJJp

damages suffered by KTM.
Finally, in the event this Court upholds the district court's decision to provide the
jury with a second verdict form, Kolob and Apex are still entitled to a new trial in this
matter on the issue of consequential damages. This is because there was insufficient
evidence to support the jury's decision to award $120,000 in consequential damages to
KTM.

ARGUMENT

I.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED WHEN IT REQUIRED THE JURY TO
COMPLETE A SECOND SPECIAL VERDICT FORM.
When the jury in this case completed its initial Special Verdict Form, it made two

factual findings that are relevant to this appeal. First, the jury determined that both KTM
and Kolob were mistaken regarding Kolob's ability to terminate its contract with its
existing pharmacy, Superior Care. In doing so, the jury upheld KTM's "mutual mistake"
defense to liability. Second, and in addition to its initial finding regarding a mutual
mistake, the jury determined that Kolob suffered lost profits in the amount of$143,989.00.
~
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Based on these two findings, the district court determined that the jury's initial
Special Verdict Form was inconsistent because the findings regarding mutual mistake and
damages were contradictory. In turn, the court resubmitted the case to the jury with a
Second Special Verdict Form, along with instructions to the jury that it must either uphold
the mutual mistake defense or award damages to KTM. The court expressly precluded the
jury from doing both.
As will be shown more fully below, the district court erred when it disregarded the
jury's first Special Verdict Form and resubmitted the case to the jury. This is because Utah
courts are required to reconcile an inconsistent verdict form whenever possible. In doing
so, courts must accept any view of the case that makes the verdict form consistent.
In this case, the jury's findings regarding mutual mistake and damages can be
reconciled. This is because the jury's determination that Kol ob suffered damages is only
a finding of fact. It places a figure on the amount of lost profits that Kolob would have
earned had the contract been performed. However, the jury's decision to calculate lost
profits does not mean that Kolob is liable for those lost profits. Rather, liability is a legal
determination made by the court in a final judgment. In this case, the jury's determination
that there was a mutual mistake means that the underlying contract was unenforceable, thus
precluding a court from holding Kolob liable for KTM's lost profits. Therefore, since the
jury's first Special Verdict Form can be reconciled, the case should be remanded with
instructions to district court to enter a judgment which states that Kolob is not liable for
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any damages.

A.

Courts Must Attempt to Reconcile Inconsistent Verdict Forms.

Utah courts have a "duty ... to reconcile special verdicts if possible."

Tooele

Associates Ltd. Partnership v. Tooele City, 2012 UT App 214, ,r 10,284 P.3d 709. "Where
the possibility of inconsistency injury interrogatories or special verdicts exists, the courts
will not presume inconsistency; rather, they will seek to reconcile the answers if possible."

Bennion v. ~eGrand Johnson Constr. Co., 701 P.2d 1078, 1083 (Utah 1985). "'When
reviewing claims that a jury verdict is inconsistent, [courts] must accept any reasonable
view of the case that makes the jury's answers consistent."' Neffv. Neff, 2011 UT 6,

,r 49

n. 20, 247 P.3d 380 (quoting Heno v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 208 F.3d 847, 852 (10th
Cir.2000)). "[A]jury's verdict will be sustained, even in the face of possible inconsistency,
if the judgment can 'be read harmoniously."' Neff, 2011 UT 6 at ,r 76 (quoting Bennion,
701 P.2d at 1083). Therefore, the ultimate question "is whether it is reasonable to construe
the jury's verdict ... in a manner that gives effect to all of the jury's responses on the special
verdict form." Id. Otherwise stated, "[g]iven the choice of two competing reasonable
alternatives, [courts] are bound to adopt the construction of the verdict that does not nullify
the jury's answers." Id at ,r 85.
~

When reconciling apparent inconsistencies on a special verdict form, "'the answers
to the questions are to be construed in the context of the surrounding circumstances of the
case and in connection with the pleadings, instructions, and issues submitted."' Tooele
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Associates Ltd. Partnership, 2012 UT App 214 at ,r 11,284 P.3d 709 (quoting Charles Alan
Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure: Civil§ 2510 (3d ed. 2011); see

also Neff, 2011 UT 6 at ,r 85 (noting the importance of the jury instructions in the court's
attempt to reconcile responses on a special verdict form). Furthermore, courts must
presume that the jury followed the jury instructions. See Moore v. Burton Lumber &

Hardware Co., 631 P.2d 865, 869 (Utah 1981); State v. Nelson, 2011 UT App 107,

,r 4,

253 P .3d 1094 ("In the absence of the appearance of something persuasive to the contrary,
we assume that the jurors were conscientious in performing ... their duty, and that they
followed the instructions of the court."). Finally, if special verdicts may be reconciled, the
trial court should apply the law and render a verdict consistent with the jury's findings.

Dishinger v. Potter, 2001 UT App 209, ,r 17, 47 P.3d 76 (In the case of a special verdict,
"the jury only finds the facts, and the court applies the law thereto and renders the
verdict.").
Based on the foregoing, the district court undoubtedly had a duty to try and reconcile
the jury's first Special Verdict Form. As will be shown more fully below, the court could
have done so by finding that Kolob was not liable for the lost profits that KTM suffered
because the relevant contract was based on a mutual mistake. This legal determination
would not have nullified the jury's calculation of lost profits. Rather, the Court would
simply be making a legal determination as to the relevance of lost profits in light of the
jury's finding regarding mutual mistake.
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Gj

B.

The Jury's Finding of a Mutual Mistake Can Be Reconciled with Its
Calculation of Lost Profits.

The district court's decision to disregard the jury's first Special Verdict Form was
based on its determination the jury's finding of mutual mistake was inconsistent with the
jury's decision regarding lost profits. However, these two findings can easily be reconciled
because the defense of mutual mistake is not dependent on a finding that there was no
contract or breach. To the contrary, a contract must exist before the defense of mutual
mistake can even be considered. This is because a mutual mistake defense does not go to
the creation of a contract. Rather, it addresses the enforceability of an otherwise valid
contract. See Red Bridge Capital, LLC v. Dos Lagos, LLC, 2016 UT App 162, 115, 381
P.3d 1147 ("A mutual mistake of fact can provide the basis for equitable rescission ... of a
contract even when the contract appears on its face to be a complete and binding integrated
agreement.") (citation and internal quotations omitted). In other words, a jury does not
need to consider the mutual mistake defense unless it first determines that a breach of
contract has even occurred.
In this case, the jury's determination that K1M suffered $143,989 in lost profits
simply reflects its initial determination that Kolob breached a contract with K1M. It does
not address the next logical step of whether the contract is enforceable such that Ko lob is
liable for KTM's lost profits. Rather, the issue of enforceability of the contract was
addressed separately when the jury considered Kolob's mutual mistake defense. However,
once the jury found that a mutual mistake had occurred, it was then the district court's duty
32
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to make the legal determination that Ko lob was not liable for KTM' s lost profits.
Therefore, the court erred when it failed to accept the jury's first Special Verdict Form and
enter a judgment which states that Kol ob is not liable for damages.
In order for this court to reconcile the jury's first Special Verdict Form, it is
important to understand that Kolob's mutual mistake defense was not based on a belief that
no contract existed between Kolob and KTM. In fact, the defense of mutual mistake
assumes that a contract between the parties does exist. What the defense does challenge,
however, is the enforceability of the relevant contract. This is because any contract based
on a mutual mistake is subject to rescission and is voidable. In fact, "Utah courts have
consistently recognized the doctrine of mutual mistake of fact as a basis for equitable
rescission of a contract that appears on its face to be an integrated contract." Kendall Ins.,
Inc. v. R&R Group. Inc., 2008 UT App 235,

1 15, 189 P.3d 114.

In other words, "what

appears to be a complete and binding integrated agreement ... may be voidable for fraud,
duress, mistake or the like .... " West One Trust Co. v. Morrison, 861 P.2d 1058, 1061
(Utah Ct.App.1993) (emphasis added).
Kolob's challenge to the enforceability of the relevant contract (as opposed the
creation of the contract) is consistent with the Court's jury instructions regarding the
mutual mistake defense. See Neff, 2011 UT 6 at ,r 85 (noting the importance of the jury
instructions in the court's attempt to reconcile responses on a special verdict form). For
example, Jury Instruction No. 31 ("Issues in a breach of contract case") stated that "Kolob

33

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

denies KTM' s claims and in its defense claims that any contract between the parties is
unenforceable based on a mutual mistake ...." (R. at 3898, p.267).

Similarly, Jury

Instruction No. 43 ("Mutual mistake") stated "Kolob claims that the contract is not
enforceable because both parties were mistaken about Kolob's ability to terminate its
contract with Superior Care." (Id. at p.274).
Based on the foregoing, the district court could have certainly reconciled the jury's
first Special Verdict Form. Before the jury could even consider Kolob's mutual mistake
defense, ·it was first required to determine whether a contract between Kol ob and KTM
even existed and, if so, whether the contract was breached. This was properly reflected in
the Special Verdict Form's first two questions, which asked (i) whether "Defendant Kolob
entered into a contract with Plaintiff KTM", and (ii) whether "Defendant Ko lob breached
the contract you have determined that Defendant Kolob entered into with PlaintiffKTM."
filJ
(R. at 2546).

In order for the jury to answer the Special Verdict Form's second question regarding
breach, it necessarily had to determine whether or not KTM suffered any damages. This
is because Jury Instruction No. 32 ("Elements of breach of contract") stated that one of the
facts that KTM needed to prove in order to establish a breach of contract is that it was
~

"damaged." (R. at 3898, p.268); see also America West Bank Members, L.C. v. State of
Utah, 2014 UT 49, il 15 ("The elements of a prima facie case for breach of contract" include

"damages."). In other words, when the jury in this case determined that a breach of contract
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had occurred, it was required to answer the question of whether or not Ko lob suffered any
damages.
The jury's determination regarding mutual mistake did not, in any way, negate any
of the jury's findings regarding breach of contract. See Johnson v. ABLT Trucking Co.,
412 F.3d 1138, 1144 (10 th Cir. 2005) {"To be irreconcilably inconsistent, the jury's answers
must be 'logically incompatible .... "'). In order to find the existence of a mutual mistake,
the jury was simply asked to decide whether "Plaintiff KTM and Defendant Kolob were
mistaken regarding Defendant Kolob's ability to terminate its contract with Superior Care
prior to the date of the performance of the contract." (R. at 2547). In other words, the
mutual mistake defense was not dependent on a lack of damages suffered by KTM. It
simply asked the jury about what the parties believed when the contract was signed. As
such, there was nothing inconsistent about the jury's finding regarding mutual mistake and
the existence of damages.
Once the jury made its factual findings regarding the mutual mistake defense and
damages, the district court was then required to apply the law as to the effect of these
findings. See, e.g., Dishinger, 2001 UT App 209 at ,r 17 (In the case of a special verdict,
"the jury only finds the facts, and the court applies the law thereto and renders the
verdict."). The court failed to do so and instead erred by resubmitting the case to the jury
with instructions that it must choose between the mutual mistake defense and damages.
The court should have given legal effect to the jury's initial findings regarding the existence
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of a mutual mistake. More specifically, the court should have recognized that there was a
breach, that KTM suffered damages as a result of that breach, but that Kolob is not liable
for such damages because the underlying contact was unenforceable on the grounds of
mutual mistake. By doing so, the court would still have given effect to all of jury's factual
findings.
In sum, the district court had a legal duty to reconcile the jury's initial Special
Verdict Form to the extent possible. In doing so, the court was required to accept any
reasonable view of the case that makes the jury's answers consistent. In this case, the jury's
damage award is consistent with its finding of a mutual mistake because the mutual mistake
defense did not challenge the relevant contract's existence, but rather its enforceability.
Therefore, the district court erred when it refused to accept the jury's first Special Verdict
Form and enter a final judgment which affirmed that Kolob was not liable for the damages
KTM suffered by virtue of Kolob's successful mutual mistake defense.
C.

At a Minimum, the District Court Should Have Enforced the Damage
Calculation Contained in the Jury's First Special Verdict Form.

Even if the district court correctly determined that the jury's finding of mutual
mistake was inconsistent with its damage award, it should have at least recognized the
damage calculation of $143,989.00 contained in the first Special Verdict Form as the
amount for which Kolob is liable, as opposed to the $263,989 award in the Second Special
Verdict Form. (R. at 2545, 2554). This is because there was no inconsistency regarding
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the amount of damages in the first verdict. As such, the court's decision to allow the jury
to reconsider its original damage award was erroneous.
As discussed more fully above, the district court's decision to re-submit this case to
the jury was based on the court's belief that the jury's initial finding regarding mutual
mistake was inconsistent with its decision to award damages. Assuming, for argument
sake only, that this determination was correct, the only inconsistency that needed to be
resolved by the jury was whether or not it believed Kolob should be liable for KTM's
damages. However, once the jury resolved this inconsistency in KTM's favor, there was
no need for the jury to re-visit the amount of damages for which Kolob was liable. This is
because the jury had already made a clear and unambiguous damage calculation in the
amount of $143,989.00.
Unfortunately, when the district court allowed the jury to reconsider its first
decision, the jury returned a Second Special Verdict Form that contained an additional
$120,000.00 award to KTM for "consequential damages." (R. at 2554). This was done
despite the jury's original finding that KTM had suffered no consequential damages
whatsoever. (R. at 2545). It is believed that the basis for the jury's additional damage
award can be found in the first Special Verdict Form, which contained a handwritten note
that Kolob should be liable for KTM's "attorney fees" in addition to KTM's lost profits.
(R. at 2551 ). After the district court instructed the jury that attorney's fees are not
recoverable in this case, it appears the jury used the Second Special Verdict Form as an
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opportunity to characterize KTM' s attorney's fees as "consequential damages" so that
Kolob could be held liable for such fees. This was clearly improper because a jury cannot
be allowed to award attorney's fees to a party (either openly or covertly) where such fees
are not otherwise recoverable as a matter of law. See PC Crane Service, LLC v. McQueen

Masonry, Inc., 2012 UT App 61,, 9,273 P.3d 396 ("In Utah, a district court generally may
not award attorney fees unless provided for by contract or statute.").
In any event, it is unnecessary for this Court to delve into the jury's motive for
awarding additional damages in its Second Special Verdict Form. This is because there
was absolutely no basis for the Court's decision to have the jury to reconsider its first
damage calculation. The only arguable inconsistency in the jury's first decision pertained
to the issue ofliability. However, once Kolob's liability was clarified in the jury's second
verdict, the district court should have simply used the jury's first damage calculation as the
amount for which Kolob is liable. By doing otherwise, the court erred both by negating
the jury's first unambiguous damage calculation and by condoning the jury's indirect and
improper award of attorney's fees.

Il.

KTM FAILED TO PRODUCE SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO JUSTIFY AN
AWARD OF CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES.
In the event this Court upholds the district court's decision to provide the jury with

a second verdict form, Kolob and Apex are still entitled to a new trial in this matter on the
issue of consequential damages. This is because there was insufficient evidence to support
the jury's decision to award $120,000 in consequential damages to KTM. There was
38
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simply no evidence no evidence that Kolob's breach of contract was the proximate cause
of any damages other than lost profits. Rather, all of the out-of-pocket costs that KTM
sought to recover as consequential damages were incurred prior to its contract with Kolob.
Moreover, even if KTM is entitled to recover some of its pre-contract start-up costs
as consequential damages, it cannot recover any costs associated with the services of Trent
Decker, who is the pharmacist Mr. Katschke hired in April 2010 to work for Meadow
Valley Pharmacy. This is because Mr. Decker never worked for KTM and never received
any compensation from KTM. Rather, Mr. Decker worked for a completely separate
pharmacy owned by Mr. Katschke. In the absence of Mr. Decker's compensation, KTM
did not incur sufficient start-up costs to justify a consequential damage award of $120,000.
Rather, the evidence shows start-up costs of only $33,304.54. (R. at Tr. Exhibit 34).
Therefore, the defendants are entitled to a new trial on the issue of consequential damages.

A.

Legal Standard for a New Trial

According to Rule 59, a trial judge may grant a new trial when, inter alia, there is
an "[i]nsufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision." Utah R. Civ. P.
59(a)(6). The Utah Supreme Court has stated that "[i]f the trial court can reasonably
conclude that there was insufficient evidence to justify the verdict," then an order granting
anew trial is appropriate. Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exchange, 817 P.2d 789,804 (Utah 1991).
On appeal, this Court will reverse a trial court's denial of a motion for a new trial
under Rule 59(a)(6) "if it concludes that the evidence, when viewed most favorably for the
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prevailing party, is insufficient to support the verdict." Tingey v. Christensen, 1999 UT
68, ,I 7, 987 P.2d 588. Furthermore, the appealing party has the burden of marshaling the
evidence in support of the verdict and showing that the evidence, viewed in the light most
favorable to the verdict, is insufficient. Id.
B.

Standard for Proving Consequential Damages.

"As a general rule, legal damages serve the important purpose of compensating an
injured party for actual injury sustained, so that she may be restored, as nearly as possible,
to the position she was in prior to the injury." Castillo v. Atlanta Cas. Co., 939 P.2d 1204,
1209 (Utah Ct.App.1997) (citing 25 C.J.S. Damages §§ 1, 3 (1966). Typically, there are
two types of damages a non-breaching party can recover in an action for breach of contract:
"general damages, which flow naturally from the breach, and consequential damages,
which, while not an invariable result of breach, were reasonably foreseeable by the parties
at the time the contract was entered into." Id. (citing Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 701 P .2d
795, 801 (Utah 1985)).
"To recover consequential damages, a non-breaching party must prove (1) that
consequential damages were caused by the contract breach; (2) that consequential damages
ought to be allowed because they were foreseeable at the time the parties contracted; and
(3) the amount of consequential damages within a reasonable certainty." Mahmood v.
Ross, 1999 UT 104,120, 990 P.2d 933 (citing Castillo v. Atlanta Cas. Co., 939 P.2d 1204,

1209 (Utah Ct.App.1997)).
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(i;

With respect to the first element of causation, courts look to whether the defendant's
breach of contract was the "proximate cause'~ of the damages sought by plaintiff.
Mahmood, 1999 UT 104 at 122. "'Proximate cause is that cause which, in the natural and

·continuous sequence[ ] (unbroken by an efficient intervening cause), produces the injury
and without which the result would not have occurred. It is the efficient cause--the one that
necessarily sets in operation the factors that accomplish the injury.'" Id. (quoting Harline
v. Barker, 912 P.2d 433, 439 (Utah 1996)).

Therefore, courts should only allow

consequential damages to be awarded where "there is any evidence which might lead a
reasonable jury to find a causal connection between a breach and a subsequent injury." Id.
(emphasis added).
C.

KTM Failed to Show that Kolob's Breach was the Proximate Cause of
Any Consequential Damages.

At trial, KTM failed to present any evidence which showed that it incurred any costs
in connection with the relevant contract after the contract was signed on May 24, 2010. In

other words, there was no evidence that KTM purchased any drugs, supplies or other
equipment for Kolob's residents after the contract was finalized. In fact, KTM never
provided any services whatsoever to Kol ob' s residents because Kol ob notified KTM of its
intent not to use KTM as its pharmacy prior to the day KTM was to begin providing service.
(R. at 3895, Tr. Exhibit 2).

The only evidence that KTM presented regarding its costs were costs that it incurred
prior to signing the contract with Kolob. Moreover, these were not costs that specifically
41
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~

related to Kolob. Rather, these were general start-up costs that KTM needed to incur in
order to establish and operate a closed-door pharmacy, as was its business plan. For
example, KTM incUITed costs related to construction, computers, an alarm system, state
and federal licen~ing costs, books and employee training. (R. at 3896, p.186-87; Tr.
Exhibit 34). Mr. Katschke also claims that he hired Trent Decker so that KTM would have
another full-time pharmacist on staff. (R. at 3896, p.140-41). In other words, these were
the type of costs that any new closed-door pharmacy would need to incur before it could
become operational. They were simply the costs of starting up a business.
More importantly, none of these costs were incurred after KTM signed its contract
with Kolob on May 24, 2010. For example, all of the construction and remodeling that
KTM performed in order to become licensed was completed between January and April,
2010 and all of the computers were purchased in early May 2010. See (R. at 3896, p.22427; 231-240). Moreover, Trent Decker's employment contract was signed on April 17th,
2010, and had a three-year term beginning May 1, 2010. (Id. at p.136, 204).
Since all of the foregoing costs were incurred before the relevant contract was
signed, they are not recoverable as consequential damages. As explained more fully above,
consequential damages are only recoverable if they were "caused by the contract breach."

Mahmood, 1999 UT 104 at ,r20. The contract breach must be what "'sets in operation the
factors that accomplish the injury.'" Id. at ,22. In this case, Kolob's breach could not have
caused KTM to incur the foregoing set-up costs because the breach occurred after the costs
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were incurred. See id. (In order to award consequential damages, a jury must "find a causal
connection a breach and a subsequent injury.") (emphasis added).

In other words, the

contract breach did not "produce[] the injury" for which KTM is seeking to recover. Id.
Rather, the relevant costs were produced by KTM' s desire to establish a closed-door
pharmacy that could eventually be used to service several potential customers, including
Kolob. These start-up costs are simply are not the type of costs that are recoverable as
consequential damages that flow from the breach of contract.
Based on the foregoing, there is no evidence that KTM suffered any consequential
damages as a result of Kol ob' s breach. Therefore, since the evidence is insufficient to
support the jury's $120,000 consequential damage award, the defendants are entitled to a
new trial on the issue.

D.

Trent Decker's Salary is Not Recoverable as Consequential Damage
Because He Never Worked for or Was Paid by KTM.

As explained more fully above, KTM's claim for consequential damages can
essentially be broken down into two categories. The first category is the $33,302.54 in
remodeling, licensing, computer and equipment costs that KTM incurred and which are
outlined in Trial Exhibit No. 34. (R. at 3896, p.185). The second category is the salary
and benefits that Mr. Katschke claims that he was required to pay Trent Decker for his
services as a pharmacist. Mr. Decker had a three-year contract that provided him with a
salary and benefits totaling $120,000 per year. (R. at 3896, p.136, 204).
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Even if this Court believes that KTM was entitled to recover its $33,302.54 in startup costs as consequential damages, the defendants are still entitled to a new trial. This is
because KTM is still not entitled to recover any costs related to Mr. Decker because Mr.
Decker never worked for and was never paid by KTM. In the absence of Mr. Decker's
compensation, KTM's remaining start-up costs of $33,302.54 simply do not justify a
consequential damage award of $120,000. Therefore, the defendants are entitled to a new
trial on this issue.
At trial, Mr. Katschke testified that he owned another pharmacy in addition to KTM.
This pharmacy, known as Meadow Valley Pharmacy, was located in Nevada and was a
completely separate corporate entity. The two pharmacies maintained separate books and
records and had separate tax identification numbers. (R. at 3896, p.223-24).
Prior to 2010, Mr. Katschke had worked as Meadow Valley's full-time pharmacist.
(R. at 3896, p.127-28). However, in April 2010, Mr. Katschke testified that he anticipated

leaving Meadow Valley so that he could begin working at KTM full-time. (Id). The
purpose behind the move was to allow Mr. Katschke to service Kolob's needs full time
after Kol ob and KTM signed their agreement. (Id.). In order to fill his soon to be vacant
position at Meadow Valley, Mr. Katschke hired Mr. Decker in April 2010 to work at
Meadow Valley and become its full-time pharmacist. (R. at 3896, p.140-41).
Mr. Katschke never actually began working for KTM because Kolob breached the
relevant contract soon after it was signed. KTM never actually provided any drugs or
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services to Kolob's residents and therefore Mr. Katschke's services were no longer needed.
As a result, KTM was never required to pay Mr. Katschke and it was able to avoid any
costs related to his services. (R. at 3896, p.248-49). Moreover, Mr. Katschke admitted at
trial that Mr. Decker's contract was with Meadow Valley and that he never performed any
services for KTM. Rather, Mr. Decker was paid directly by Meadow Valley. (/d at p.27778).

In fact, Meadow Valley was never damaged by Mr. Decker's hiring because it

received the full benefit of his services.
In any event, Meadow Valley is not a party to this action. Therefore, any costs it
may have incurred in hiring Mr. Decker are not recoverable. The only plaintiff in this
matter is KTM and Mr. Katschke has admitted that KTM never hired or paid Mr. Decker
anything. As such, Mr. Decker's salary and benefits were not costs incurred by KTM that
can be recovered in this action as a consequential damages.
Without the inclusion of Mr. Decker's compensation, KTM failed to present
sufficient evidence to justify the jury's $120,000 consequential damages award. Therefore,
defendants respectfully request a new trial on the issue.
CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Kol ob and Apex respectfully request this court (i) to reverse
the district court's ruling that the jury's first Special Verdict Form was so inconsistent that
it required the case to be resubmitted to the jury, and (ii) to find that the parties' contract is
void by virtue of the jury's findings regarding mutual mistake. Alternatively, Kolob and
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<t

Apex respectfully request this Court to reverse the district court's decision to uphold the
damage award contained in the jury's Second Special Verdict Form. Finally, in the event
this Court upholds the jury's Second Special Verdict Form, Kolob and Apex respectfully
request this Court to remand the case for a new trial on the issue of consequential damages.
DATED this 26th day of January, 2017.
JENSON & GUELKER, PLLC

By:~-~--------.......

G~ELKER
Attorneys for KTM and Apex
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•
•

That means it would be 10:30.

1

hours.

2

If you want to take an hour and then let me know

3

if you feel that you can get done tonight,

4

fine.

5

decision on how we're going to proceed to

6

tomorrow.

7

juiies sometimes last through the weekends.

8

last through Sundays.

9

and I ' l l apologize right now.

It's 8 : 3 0 .

If not,

let me know,

that's

and we'll make a

I know this has been hard .on you,

It's

just part of our
I

and
They
job,

should have had

10

this as a five-day

11

And so if you want to curse somebody,

12

me,

13

hour of your time ~onight,

14

bailiff an idea that either you need a little more

15

time to get things done or we're going to have to

16

come back tomorrow,

17

here,

jury,

you can curse me.

Monday through Friday.
you can do

But give me at least an
and if you can give the

then we'll reassemble you

in

and we'll make some decisions at that time.

18

(Whereupon,

19

adjourned to await the

20

verdict.)

21

(Court reconvened at 11:51 p.m.

22

jury return.)

23

THE COURT:

at 8:36 p.m.

the court

jury's

for

I ' l l note that all parties

24

and counsel are present.

25

a verdict before Halloween.

It is 11:50.

We'll have

Thank you for your
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1

work.
Would the

2

jury foreperson identify

3

themselves.

4

and if i t ' s agreed upon by at least six

And has the

jury reached a verdict,
jurors?

5

THE JUROR:

Yes.

6

THE COURT:

I'd like the bailiff to --

7

or have the foreperson hand the verdict to the

8

bailiff,

let me review it.
I'm going to have the clerk read the

9

10

verdict.

11

except that in the total damage award I won't read

12

that amount now.

13

attorney's fees."

14

issue in the case.

15

perhaps counsel can elaborate if they wish to

16

after that,

17

the verdict into the record.

18

I

think it's appropriate in all respects

It's been penciled.in "plus
Attorney's fees were not an
I' 11 make that statement,

and

but I'm going to ask the clerk to read

THE CLERK:

Do you want me to read that

20

THE COURT:

Yes.

21

THE CLERK:

In the Fifth Judicial

19

total?

22

District Court,

23

KTM Health Care,

24

plaintiff,

25

limited liability company d/b/a Kolob Care and

Washington County,
Inc.,

State of Utah,

a Utah corporation,

versus SG Nursing Home,

LLC,

a Delaware
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1

Rehabilitation of St.

2

Solutions,

3

company,

No.

Judge Jeffrey C. Wilcox presiding.

As to the breach of contract claim

7

formation and breach.

8

presented to you,

9

of the evidence that defendant Kolob entered into

10

After weighing the evidence

do you find by a preponderance

a contract with plaintiff KTM?

11

Yes.

Do you find by a preponderance of the

12

evidence that defendant Kolob breached the

13

contract you have determined defendant Kolob

14

entered into with plaintiff KTM?

15

•

defendants.

100503405.

6

@D

an Illinois limited liability

Special verdict form in Case

4
5

LLC,

George and Apex Health Care

Yes.

Do you find by a preponderance of the

16

evidence that defendant Kolob breached the Implied

17

Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing?

18

Yes.

Kolob's affirmative defense mutual

19

mistake.

20

evidentiary standard of clear and convincing

21

evidence that defendant Kolob's ability to

22

terminate its contract with Omnicare was a basic

23

assumption or an important fact upon which both

24

plaintiff KTM and defendant Kolob had knowledge

25

and upon which plaintiff KTM and defendant Kolob

Do you find by the heightened
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1

based their contract?

2

Yes.

Do you find by the heightened standard

3

of clear and convincing evidence that at the time

4

the contract was formed between plaintiff KTM and

5 defendant Kolob both plaintiff KTM and defendant
6

Kolob were mistaken regarding defendant Kolob's

7

ability to terminate its contract with Omnicare

8

prior to the date of performance of the contract?

9

Yes.

10

Kolob's affirmative defense antikickback

11

statute.

12

evidence that the price at which KTM offered to

13

service Kolob's Medicare Part A residents is

14

remuneration as defined in the antikickback

15

statute?

16

Do you find by a preponderance of the

No.
Damages.

Do you find by a preponderance

17

of the evidence that plaintiff KTM suffered

18

damages· as a result of defendant Kolob' s breach of

19

the contract or breach of the Covenant of Good

20

Faith and Fair Dealing?

21

Yes.

What is the amount of lost profits

22

plaintiff KTM suffered as a result of defendant

23

Kol ob' s

24
25

breach of contract?

143,989.

Did plaintiff KTM suffer any additional
losses reasonably anticipated within the
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~

1

contemplation of the parties?
Total damages,

2

breach of contract.

3

Please sum your answers from Question 11 and

4

Question 13 to determine plaintiff KTM's total

5

damage award.

6

consequential damages,

7

143,989.

9

10

zero;

143,989;
total damage award

Just a second.

damage award includes that amount,

The total

and then what

does it say?

11

12

Lost profits,

THE COURT:

8

THE CLERK:
attorney fees.

13

Then it does say plus

I misunderstood you,

Vicarious liability.

Your Honor.

Do you find by a

14

preponderance of the evidence that defendant Kolob

15

and defendant Apex are the alter egos of one

16

another?

17
~

No.

Yes.
Do you find by a preponderance of the

18

evidence that defendant Kolob was an agent of

19

defendant Apex?

20
21

Yes.

Dated October 30,
the

2140,

and signed by

jury foreperson.

22

THE COURT:

There is a mutual mistake

23

was answered yes and yes on both of them.

24

Counsel,

25

don't you come up.

how do you want to proceed on that?
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1

(Off-the-record bench conference.)

2

THE COURT:

Folks,

perhaps because the

3

verdict form was not plain enough,

4

inconsistencies here.

5

you.

6

but I'm going to ask you to go back,

7

shouldn't take long.

want to explain them to

I don't think that it would take you long,
and it really

You have found that there's been a

8

9

I

there are

An affirmative defense to

breach of the contract.

10

the breach of contract is mutual mistake,

11

found that there was mutual mistake.

12

a mutual mistake made,

13

It never formed,

14

damages.

15

appeal with that instruction,

16

go back and consider if,

17

clear and convincing evidence that there was

18

mutual mistake based on Questions 4 and 5,

19

you can't find a contract and find damages.

20

matter of fact,

21

be awarded is if it's in the contract or if

22

there's a

23

would be involved,

24

that you did -- the contract did not have an

25

attorney's fees clause.

and you

If there was

then there was no contract.

and so you couldn't award

And rather than have this go up on
I

would like you to

in fact,

you found by

then

the only time attorney's fees

statute.

As a
can

There was no statute that
and if you read -- and I'm sure

If there had been one,
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(I

Qi)

1

would have been arguing about it and about the

2

amount.

3

plus atto~ney's fees is also I

4

of law I

And since i t ' s not,

your suggestion here
guess as a matter

can't do that.

5

Do we have a -- Judy,

6

special verdict form printed out quickly,

7

let you take this in with you.

8

you is,

9

change your -- your -- your mind on this.

on page 3

can we get another
and I ' l l

But my question to

and I'm not asking you to
If you

10

found by clear and convincing evidence that there

11

was a mutual mistake,

12

further,

13

without damages,

14

sort of a· finding of vicarious liability.

15

on this one we should have said if you find mutual

16

mistake it said to proceed to Question No.

17

should have said stop your deliberations,

18

jury verdict form and return it.

19

some sense to you?

2Q

OU t?

21
22

then you really shouldn't go

and you sign the

jury verdict form

and you don't need to have any
Perhaps

6.

We

sign the

Does that make

Do we have a new one printed

have to go to my desk,

THE CLERK:

I

THE COURT:

We're going to hand you a

and

do it.

23
24

new one,

and I'm going to give you this old one to

25

review.

And we're going to

i)

•

--

when you leave

(435) 868-1075
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1

we'll have some statement made on the record.

2

let's all rise for the

3

have the bailiff bring a new jury verdict form to

4

you,

5

to be after midnight,

6

date and put a time on that as well.

jury.

So

Go -- and we will

and on that one would you also -- i t ' s going

I

7

so make sure you get the new

guess this is something that happens

8

when we do this late at night.

9

caught that.

10

All rise.

Mr.

MR.

Guelker,

GUELKER:

~

We should have

make a record.

Sure,

Your Honor.

I

would

11

object to sending the

12

which you did.

13

found that there was a mutual mistake,

14

findings were irrelevant because once there's

15

mutual mistake the contract was unenforceable,

16

there should have been no damages.

17

despite the mistake on the verdict form,

18

found mutual mistake,

19

and everything leading after that is really null

20

and void.

21

And,

It's our position that once they
any further
a
and

So even
once they

that really ended the matter

Your Honor,

just a small thing.

Ci)

I

22

forgot to bring this up before.

23

record objection to a mistake we made in closing

24

arguments.

25

effect this is your chance to send a message.

Mr.

•

jury back in the manner in

I want to make a

Heideman said something to the
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1

just like it noted that I

think that was

2

inappropriate and inconsistent with the jury

3

instruction on ·the law on breach of contract.

4

I

5

objection was made.

So

just wanted to note that for the record so that

ii)

6

THE COURT:

7

Mr.

Heideman,

8

happened?
MR.

9

10
~

That's fine.

And,

any statement regarding what's

HEIDEMAN:

THE COURT:

Nothing,

just

Your Honor.

I'd like them to wait here.

11

I

12

but we need to get the special verdict and a

13

second one.

14

it unless you agree that on the bottom of page 3

15

that I write something If you answer Question

16

No.

17

sign and date the

18

leave it as is?

don't think this is going to take a long time,

5 yes,

19

I'm not going to make any changes on

don't answer any further questions,

MR.

jury form.

Should I do that

or

Sending it back we might

GUELKER:

20

as well make that decision.

21

to make.

It's a small change

We should probably go ahead and do that.

22

THE COURT:

23

MR.

Mr.

HEIDEMAN:

Heideman.
Your Honor,

24

Court's

25

they'll be able to follow it.

I think the

just given them the instruction.

I

think

If the Court feels
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1

like it needs to do that,

2

they've got the instruction,

3

what they need to do.

that's fine,

but I

think

and they understand

THE COURT:

All right.

6

(Whereupon,

a recess was taken.)

7

THE COURT:

I ' l l note all parties are

4
5

Let's go do

that.

8

present.

And I

9

our foreperson.

take it that Mr.

Jensen is again

And I'm just going to ask,

you've

10

reached a verdict that's been agreed upon by at

11

least six jurors?

12

THE JUROR:

Yes.

13

THE COURT:

Let's have it.

Counsel,

14

have marked this as second.

15

and.both verdicts are going to be part of the

16

record but

17

take a look at it.

18
19

I

handwrote

I

"second,"

just to denote which was which.

Let me

I ' l l have the clerk read this into the
record.

20

THE CLERK:

In the Fifth Judicial

21

District Court,

22

KTM Health Care,

23

plaintiff,

24

limited liability company d/b/a Kolob Care and

25

Rehabilitation of St.

Washington County,
Inc.,

State of Utah,

a Utah corporation,

versus SG Nursing Home,

LLC,

a Delaware

George and Apex Health Care
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1

Solutions,

2

company,

No.

defendants.

100503405.

5

Judge Jeffrey C.

Wilcox presiding.

As to the breach of contract claim

6

formation and breach.

7

presented to you,

8

of the evidence that defendant Kolob entered into

9

a

After weighing the evidence

do you find by a preponderance

contract with plaintiff KTM?

10

Yes.

Do you find by a preponderance of the

11

evidence that defendant Kolob breached the

12

contract you have determined defendant Kolob

13

entered into with plaintiff KTM?

14

Yes.

Do you find by a preponderance of the

15

evidence that defendant Kolob breached the Implied

16

Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing?

17

•

an Illinois limited liability

Second special verdict form in Case

3

4

LLC,

Yes.

Kolob's affirmative defense mutual

18

mistake.

19

evidentiary standard of clear and convincing

20

evidence that defendant Kolob's ability to

21

terminate its contract with Omnicare was a basic

22

assumption or an important fact upon which both

23

plaintiff KTM and defendant Kolob had knowledge

24

and upon which plaintiff KTM and defendant Kolob

25

based their contract?

Do you find by the heightened

Yes.
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Do you find by the heightened standard

1
2

of clear and convincing evidence that at the time

3

the contract was formed between plaintiff KTM and

4

defendant Kolob both plaintiff KTM and defendant

5

Kolob were mistaken regarding defendant Kolob's

6

ability to terminate its contract with Omnicare

7

prior to the date of performance of the contract?

8

Yes.
Kolob's affirmative defense antikickback

9

10

statute.

11

evidence that the price at which KTM offered to

12

service Kolob's Medicare Part A residents is

13

remuneration as defined in the antikickback

14

statute?

15

Do you find by a preponderance of the

No.
Damages.

Do you find by a preponderance

16

of the evidence that plaintiff KTM suffered

17

damages as a result of defendant Kolob's breach of

18

the contract or breach of the Covenant of Good

19

Faith and Fair Dealing?

20

Yes.

What is the amount of lost profits

21

plaintiff KTM suffered as a result of defendant

22

Ko lob's breach of contract?

23

143,989.

Did plaintiff KTM suffer any additional

24

losses reasonably anticipated within the

25

contemplation of the parties?

No.
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Total damages,

1
2

Please sum your answers from Question 11 and

3

Question 13 t~ determine plaintiff KTM's total

4

damage award.

5

consequential damages,

6

143,989.

zero;

143,989;
total damage award,

8

losses reasonably anticipated within the

9

contemplation of the parties?

10
~

Lost profits,

Did plaintiff KTM suffer any additional

7
it}

breach of contract.

11

Yes.

What is the amount of additional damages
KTM suffered?

12

$120,000.

Total damages.

13

lost profits,

14

$120,000;

15

$143,989;

KTM's total damage award
consequential damages,

total damage award,

263,989.

Vicarious liability.

Do you find by a

16

preponderance of the evidence that defendant Kolob

17

and defendant Apex are the alter egos of one

18

another?

19

Yes.
Do you find by a preponderance of the

20

evidence that defendant Kolob was an agent of

21

defendant Apex?

Signed October 31,

22
23

24
25

Yes.

by the

2014,

at 12:36 a.m.

jury foreperson.
THE COURT:

Thank you.

Would either of

the parties like to poll the jury.
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1

MR.

GUELKER:

2

THE COURT:

Yes,

e·ach of you this question.

4

and is this your verdict?

5

THE JUROR:

Yes,

6

THE COURT:

Ms.

THE JUROR:

Yes.

9

THE COURT:

And,

THE JUROR:

Yes.

12

THE COURT:

And,

THE JUROR:

Yes.

15

THE COURT:

Ms.

it is.
Barnum,

THE JUROR:

Yes.

18

THE COURT:

Ms.

Mr.

Jensen,

Ms.

Boone,

Bauer,

was this

was this and

~

was this and is

Bingham,

was this and is

this your verdict?

20

THE JUROR:

Yes.

21

THE COURT:

And,

22

this and is this your verdict?

23

THE JUROR:

Yes.

24

THE COURT:

And,

25

was this and is

this your verdict?

17

19

was this

is this your verdict?

14

16

Lustig,

and is this your verdict?

11

13

would.

this your· verdict?

8

10

Ms.

I

I'm going to ask

All right.

3

7

Your Honor,

Mr.

Mr.

Buckingham,

Diamond,

was

was this

and is this your verdict?
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1

THE JUROR:

Yes.

2

THE COURT:

Counsel,

is there anything

3

else necessary before I

4

will entertain some motions shortly.
MR.

5

6

discharge the

GUELKER:

jury.

Not at this time,

We

Your

Honor.
THE COURT:

7

8

and hard.

9

admonition.

Folks,

you've worked long

You're released from your

jury

You now have the right to speak about

10

this case.

11

it.

12

experience here and some person persists in trying

13

to get you to talk about it,

14

telephone or in writing,

15

person.

You have the right not to speak about

If you decline to discuss the case or your

16

please contact me by

and I will deal with that

Thank you for your participation,

17

effort and your service.

18

don't have to,

19

for

20

stay.

I ' l l try and get in as soon as I

21

Again,

I've discharged you,

22

Thank you.

23

hard.

24

25

your

You're free to go.

You

but I'd like to meet with you each

just a moment afterwards.

Thank you,

Mr.

All rise for the
At this time I

You don't have to

and I
Booth,

can.

excuse you.
for also working

jury.
would assign the

prevailing party to submit the

judgment.

Both
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1

verdicts will be entered.

2

i t ' s time now to make motions.

3

written motions,

4

we've had some sleep.

Is that okay?

MR.

GUELKER:

6

MR.

HEIDEMAN:

7

THE COURT:

9
10

I ' l l entertain

and let's deal with it after

5

8

I will -- I don't think

Thank you,

Your Honor.

That's fine,

Your Honor.

We'll go off the record

then.

(Whereupon, the proceedings
concluded at 12:50 a.m.)

11
12
13
14

Gt

15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

MARY BETH COOK, CSR, RPR
(435) 868-1075
161 South 200 West Cedar City, UT 84720
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

336

4i

ADDENDUMB

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

· s1. eta
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

KTM HEALTH CARE, INC., a Utah
Corporation,
Plaintiff,
SPECIAL VERDICT FORM

vs.
SG NURSING HOME, LLC, a Delaware
Limited Liability Company, doing business as
KOLOB CARE AND REHABILITATION
OF ST. GEORGE,. and APEX
HEALTHCARE SOLUTIONS, LLC, an
Illinois Limited Liability Company,

Case No. 100503405

Judge Jeffrey C. Wilcox

Defendants.

SPECIAL VERDICT FORM
Now that you have reviewed all the instructions in this case, please answer the following
questions. The directions in some of the questions may ask you to answer the question only if
you answered 0 yes" to a prior question or to a prior series of questions. Please be certain to
follow the directions exactly.
The following questions are divided into subsections. At the end of each subsection there
is a question which allows you to award the amount damage, if any, suffered by KTM under
each legal theory. At the end, you will be given the opportunity to sum the various awards to
equal the final damage award.
If you have questions regarding the meaning of the terms in the questions, please review
the instructions for an explanation. If an explanation is not provided in the instructions, please
ask the bailiff to deliver your question(s) to the judge.

of

Q@
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BREACH OF CONTRACT CLAIM
Formation and Breach:
1)

After weighing the evidence presented to you, do you find by a preponderance of the

evidence that Defendant Kolob entered into a contract with Plaintiff KTM?

Yes ✓

No_ _

If you answered "yes," please proceed to question #2. If, however, you answered "no,"
please skip to question #15. If your answer to Question #1 is "no" you are instructed not to
answer questions #2 through #14.
2)

Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that Defendant Ko lob breached the

contract you have determined Defendant Kolob entered into with Plaintiff KTM?

Yes_LNo_ _
If you answered "yes," please proceed to Question #3. If, however, you answered "no,"
please skip to question #15. If your answer to question #2 is "no" you are instructed not to answer

questions #3 through #14.
3)

Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that Defendant Kolob breached the

implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing?

YesLNo _ _
If you answered "yes" to either question #2 or question #3, please proceed to question #4.
If, however, your answer to both question #2 and question #3 is "no" skip to question #15.

Additionally, if your answer to both questions #2 and #3 was "no" you are instructed not to
answer question #4 through question #14
Page 2 of 9
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Kolob's Affirmative Defense (Mutual Mistake):

4)

Do you find by the heightened evidentiary standard of clear and convincing evidence that

Defendant Kolob's ability to terminate its contract with Omnicare was a b a . ~ i ~ or an
important fact, upon which both Plaintiff KTM and Defendant Kolob had lmowleqge and upon
r

which Plaintiff KTM and Defendant Ko lob based their contract?

ex"''w•~

l

Yes-¢No~
If you answered "yes,'' please proceed to the next question. If, however, you answered
"no," please skip to question #6. If you answered "no" to question #4 you are instructed not to
I)

answer question #5.
5)

Do you find by the heightened standard of clear and convincing evidence that at the time 'fA4/ ~,, ZS iow

the contTact was formed between Plaintiff KIM and Defendant Kolob, both Plaintiff KIM and
I)

Defendant Kolob were mistaken regarding Defendant Kolob's ability to terminate its contract
.
~"t 28 'Z/14°
with Omnicare prior to the date of pea:temnrnce-of the contract?

Proceed to Question #6 on the following page.
I

/ (This section intentionally left blank)
I

I
I
I
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Kolob's Affirmative Defense (Anti-Kickback Statute):

6)

Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that the price at which KTM offered to

service Kolob's Medicare Part A residents is "remuneration" as defined in the anti-kickback
statute?

Yes_ _ NoJL_

If you answered "Yes" to question #6 please proceed to question #7. If you answer "No"
to question #6 please proceed to question # 10 without answering questions #7 through #9.
7)

Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that Plaintiff KTM lmowingly offered to

pay Defendant Kolob remuneration as defined in Jury Instructions 46 and 47?
Yes

No

If you answer "Yes" to question #7 please proceed to question #8. If you answer "No" to
question #7 please proceed to question # 10 without answering questions #8 through #9.
8)

Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that Plaintiff KTM willfully offered to

pay Defendant Kolob remuneration as defined in Jury Instructions 46 and 47?
Yes

No

If you answered "yes" to question #8 please proceed to question #9. If you answered "no" to
question #8 please proceed to question #10 without answering question #9.
9)

Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that Plaintiff KTM knowingly

and willfully offered to pay Defendant Kolob remuneration as defined in Jury Instructions 46 and

47 for the purpose of obtaining referrals?

Yes

No

Please proceed to question #10.
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~

Damages:

10)

Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that Plaintiff KTM suffered damages

as a result of Defendant Kolob's breach of the contract, or breach of the covenant of good faith

and fair dealing?
Yes_il_No_ _

If you answered "yes" please proceed to the question #11. If you answered "no" please
proceed to question #15 without answering question #11 through #14.
1I)

What is the amount oflost profits Plaintiff KIM suffered as a result of Defendant Kolob's

breach of contract? ·

Please proceed to question #12.
I
I

I

/ (This section intentionally left blank)
I
I

I
I

I
I
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12)

Did Plaintiff KTM suffer any additional losses reasonably anticipated within the

contemplation of the parties?

Yes_ _

NoL

If you answered "yes" please proceed to the question #13. If you answered "no" please
proceed to question # 14 without answering question # 13.

13)

What is the amount of additional damages KTM suffered?
$

-------------

Total Damages (Breach of Contract):

14)

Please sum your answers from question #11 and question #13 to determine Plaintiff

KTM's total damage award.
Lost Profits (question #11)
Consequential Damages (question #13)
Total Damage Award
If you answered questions #10 through #14, please skip to question #21 without answering
question #15 through question #20.
I

I
I
I
I
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PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL CLAIM

15)

Did Defendant Kol ob promise Plaintiff KTM that Defendant Kolob would use Plaintiff

KTM as Defendant Kolob's exclusive closed-door pharmacy?
Yes

No

If you answered "yes," please proceed to question #16. If you answered "no, 11 please stop
here and proceed as follows:
•

Answer no further questions,

•

Have the foreperson sign and date the last page of this form, and

•

Notify the bailiff that you are finished.

16)

Did Kolob know, or should it have expected, that this promise would lead KTM to act or

not act?

Yes

No

If you answered "yes" please proceed to question #17. If you answered "no" please stop
here and proceed as follows:
•

Answer no further questions,

•

Have the foreperson sign and date the last page of this form, and

•

Notify the bailiff that you are finished.

17)

Did KTM reasonably rely on Kolob's promise?
Yes

No

If you answered "yes" please proceed to question #18. If you answered "no," please stop
Page 7 of 9
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here and proceed as follows:
•

Answer no further questions,

•

Have the foreperson sign and date the last page of this form, and
Notify the bailiff that you are finished.

18)

Did Defendant Kolob fulfill its promise to PlaintiffKTM?
Yes

No

If you answered 11no, 11 please proceed to question #19. If you answered "yes," please stop
here and proceed as follows:
•

Answer no further questions,

•

Have the foreperson sign and date the last page of this form, and

•

Notify the bailiff that you are finished.

19)

Did KTM incur reasonable expenditures that would not have been incurred if KTM had

not relied on Kolob's promise?
Yes_ _ No
If you answered "yes" please proceed to question #20. If you answered "no" please stop
here and proceed as follows:
•

Answer no further questions,
Have the foreperson sign and date the last page of this form, and
Notify the bailiff that you are finished.

20)

What is the amount of the expenditures KTM incurred?
$_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

Please proceed to question #21 on the following page.
Page 8 of 9
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VICARIOUS LIABILITY
If you answer "yes" to any of the following questions (21 or 22), Defendant Apex will be
held jointly liable, for all damages Defendant Kolob caused PlaintiffKTM. Accordingly, please
select and answer for each of the following questions.
Alter Ego:
21)

Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that Defendant Kolob and Defendant

Apex are the alter egos of one another?

Yes_LNo _ _
Agency:
22)

Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that Defendant Kol ob was an agent of

DefendantAZ
Yes

No

If you have reached this point after following all instrnctions, and have completed this Special
Verdict Form, you are now instructed to have the jury foreperson sign and date this form. After
which, you should notify the bailiff you have completed the form and are now finished. We

Ci

sincerely thank you, and appreciate your service!

(j)

Date'

1
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)f/FILED
201~ OCT 31 AN 12: 52
SJH DISTR1CT·couR'f
ST. QE0RGE

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

KTM HEALTH CARE, INC., a Utah
Corporation,

SEecJJO

Plaintiff,

SPECIAL VERDICT FORM
vs.

SG NURSING HOME, LLC, a Delaware
Case No. l 00503405
Limited Liability Company, doing business as
KOLOB CARE AND REHABILITATION
OF ST. GEORGE, and APEX
Judge Jeffrey C. Wilcox
HEALTHCARE SOLUTIONS, LLC, an
Illinois Limited Liability Company,
Defendants.

SPECIAL VERDICT FORM
Now that you have reviewed all the instructions in this case, please answer the following
questions. The directions in some of the questions may ask you to answer the question only if
you answered "yes" to a prior question or to a prior series of questions. Please be certain to
follow the directions exactly.
The following questions are divided into subsections. At the end of each subsection there
is a question which allows you to award the amount of damage, if any, suffered by KTM under
each legal theory. At the end, you will be given the opportunity to sum the various awards to
equal the final damage award.
If you have questions regarding the meaning of the terms in the questions, please review
the instructions for an explanation. If anI explanation is not provided in the instructions, please
ask the bailiff to deliver your question(s) to the judge.
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BREACH OF CONTRACT CLAIM
Formation and Breach:
1)

Atler weighing the evidence presented to you, do you find by a preponderance of the

evidence that Defendant
Kolob entered into a contract with Plaintiff KTM?
,,
Yes_/._:._No_ _
If you answered "yes," please proceed to question #2. If, however, you answered "no,"
please skip to question #15. If your answer to Question #1 is "no" you are instructed not to
answer questions #2 through #14.
2)

Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that Defendant Ko lob breached the

contract you haveji'etermined Defendant Kolob entered into with PlaintiffKTM?

YesL No _ _
If you answered "yes," please proceed to Question #3. If, however, you answered "no, 11
please skip to question #15. If your answer to question #2 is "no" you are instructed not to answer
questions #3 through #14.
3)

Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that Defendant Kolob breached the

implied covenan1'of good faith and fair dealing?

YesLNo_ _
If you answered "yes" to either question #2 or question #3, please proceed to question #4.
If, however, your answer to both question #2 and question #3 is "no" skip to question #15.

Additionally, if your answer to both questions #2 and #3 was "no" you are instructed not to
answer question #4 through question # 14
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Kolob's Affirmative Defense (Mutual Mistake):
4)

Do you find by the heightened evidentiary standard of clear and convincing evidence that

Defendant Kolob's abilityto terminate its contract with Omnicare was a basic assumption, or an
important fact, upon which both PlaintiffKTM and Defendant Kolob had knowledge and upon
which Plaintiff KTM and Defendant Ko lob based their contract?
Yes_._No_L
If you answered "yes," please proceed to the next question. If, however, you answered
11

no,' please skip to question #6. If you answered "no" to question #4 you are instructed not to
1

answer question #5.
5)

Do you find by the heightened standard of clear and convincing evidence that at the time

the contract was fanned between PlaintiffKTM and Defendant Kolob, both Plaintiff KTM and
@I

Defendant Kolob were mistaken regarding Defendant Kolob's ability to terminate its contract
with Omnicare prior to the date of performance of the contract?
Yes__._ No

Proceed to Question #6 on the following page.
I

/ (This section intentionally left blank)
I

I
I
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Kolob's Affirmative Defense (Anti-Kickback Statute):
6)

Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that the price at which KTM offered to

, service Kolob's Medicare Part A residents is "remuneration" as defined in the anti-kickback
statute?

Yes_ _ No_ . / .
If you answered "Yes" to question #6 please proceed to question #7. If you answer "No"
to question #6 please proceed to question #10 without answering questions #7 through #9.
7)

Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that Plaintiff KTM knowingly offered to

pay Defendant Kolob remuneration as defined in Jury Instructions 46 and 47?
Yes_ _ No
If you answer "Yes" to question #7 please proceed to question #8. If you answer "No" to

question #7 please proceed to question #10 without answering questions #8 through #9.
8)

Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that Plaintiff KTM willfully offered to

pay Defendant Ko lob remuneration as defined in Jury Instructions 46 and 47?
Yes

No

lf you answered "yes"

to

question #8 please proceed

to

question #9. If you answered "no" to

question #8 please proceed to question# 10 without answering question #9.
9)

Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that Plaintiff KTM knowingly

and willfully offered to pay Defendant Kolob remuneration as defined in Jury Instructions 46 and
47 for the purpose of obtaining ref~rrals?
Yes_ _ No_ _
Please proceed to question # 10.
Page 4 of 9
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Damages:
10)

Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that Plaintiff KTM suffered damages

as a result of Defendant Kolob's breach of the contract, or breach of the covenant of good faith
and fair dealing?

YesLNo_ _
If you answered "yes" please proceed to the question #11. If you answered "no" please

proceed to question # 15 without answering question # 11 through # 14.
11)

What is the amount oflost profits Plaintiff KTM suffered as a result of Defendant Kolob's

breach of contract?

Please proceed to question #12.

I

/ (This section intentionally left blank)
I
I

I
I

I
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12)

Did Plaintiff KTM suffer any additional losses reasonably anticipated within the

contemplation of the parties?
YesLNo--,

If you answered "yes" please proceed to the question# 13. If you answered "no" please
proceed to question #14 without answering question #13.
13)

What is the amount of additional damages KTM suffered?
$

)Z01ocn

oy

Total Damages (Breach of Contract):

14)

Please sum your answers from question #11 and question #13 to determine Plaintiff

KTM's total damage award.
Lost Profits (question # 11)
Consequential Damages (question # 13)
Total Damage Award
lf you answered questions #10 through #14, please skip to question #21 without answering
question # 1S through question #20.
I

I

I
I
I
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PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL CLAIM

15)

Did Defendant Ko lob promise Plaintiff KTM that Defendant Kolob would use Plaintiff

KTM as Defendant Kolob's exclusive closed-door pharmacy?
Yes

No

If you answered 11 yes, 11 please proceed to question #16. If you answered "no," please stop
here and proceed as follows:
•

Answer no further questions,

•

Have the foreperson sign and date the last page of this form, and
Notify the bailiff that you are finished.

16)

Did Kolob know, or should it have expected, that this promise would lead KTM to act or

not act?

Yes_ _ No
If you answered "yes" please proceed to question #17. If you answered "no" please stop
a,

here and proceed as follows:
•

Answer no further questions,

•

Have the foreperson sign and date the last page of this form, and

•

Notify the bailiff that you are finished.

17)

Did KTM reasonably rely on Kolob's promise?
Yes

No_ _

If you answered "yes" please proceed to question #18. If you answered "no," please stop
Page 7 of 9
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here and proceed as follows:
•

Answer no further questions,

•

Have the foreperson sign and date the last page of this form, and

•

Notify the bailiff that you are finished.

18)

Did Defendant Ko lob fulfill its promise to Plaintiff KTM?
Yes_ _ No
lfyou answered 11 no, 11 please proceed to question #19. If you answered 11 yes, 11 please stop

here and proceed as follows:
•

Answer no further questions,
Have the foreperson sign and date the last page of this form, and

•

Notify the bailiff that you are finished .

19)

Did KTM incur reasonable expenditures that would not have been incurred if KTM had

not relied on Kolob's promise?
Yes_ _ No
If you answered "yes" please proceed to question #20. If you answered "no" please stop
here and proceed as follows:
•

Answer no further questions,

•

Have the foreperson sign and date the last page of this form, and
Notify the bailiff that you are finished.

20)

What is the amount of the expenditures KTM incurred?
$

--------------

Please proceed to question #21 on the following page.
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VICARIOUS LIABILITY
If you answer "yes" to any of the following questions (2 I or 22), Defendant Apex will be
held jointly liable, for all damages Defendant Kolob caused PlaintiffKTM. Accordingly, please

select and answer for each.pf the following questions.
~

Alter Ego:
21 )

Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that Defendant Ko lob and Defendant

Apex are the alter egos of one another?
Yes_/LNo_ _
"

Agency:
22)

Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that Defendant Ko lob was an agent of

Defendant

Apel?

Yes-·

.'10- -

If you have reached this point after following all instructions, and have completed this Special

Verdict Form, you are now instructed to have the jury foreperson sign and date this form. After
which, you should notify the bailiff you have completed the form and are now finished. We
•

sincerely thank you, and appreciate your service!

Page 9 of 9

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ADDENDUMD

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

JUSTIN D. HEIDEMAN (USB #8897)
JEFFREY 0. BISSEGGER (USB #11381)
Heideman & Associates
134 North 200 East, Ste. 210
St. George, Utah 84770
Telephone: (435) 656-3696
Fax: (435) 986-0095
Email: jheideman@heidlaw.com
jbissegger@heidlaw.com .
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
WASIDNGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
KTM HEALTH CARE, INC., a Utah
Corporation,

I)

ORDERRE:
MOTION TO RECONSIDER

Plaintiff,
_vs.
SG NURSING HO1v1E, LLC, a Delaware
Limited Liability Company, doing business
as KOLOB CARE AND
REHABILITATION OF ST. GEORGE, and
APEX HEALTHCARE SOLUTIONS, LLC,
an Illinois Limited Liability Company

Case No.: I 00503405
Judge: Jeffrey C. Wilcox

Defendants.

This matter came before the Court pursuant to Defendants' Motion to Reconsider. On July
20, 2015, Plaintiff was represented by Justin D. Heideman and Defendants were represented by
Gary Guelker. Accordingly, the Court, after reviewing all relevant documents and after hearing and
fully considering all relevant arguments of counsel and after being fully informed, does HEREBY
ORDER AND DECREE: Defendants' Motion is Denied. Plaintiff is to prepare an order of final

August 11, 2015 04:01 PM
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judgment including costs.

*Executed and Entered by the Court as indicated by the date and seal at the top of
this Order.*
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the 3rd day of August, 2015, I caused a true and correct copy of the
foregoing [PROPOSED] ORDER RE: MOTION TO RECONSIDER to be served upon the
following via the court's electronic filing system:
Jenson & Guelker
Gary R. Guelker
747 East South Temple, Ste. 130
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102

Heideman & Associates

Isl Wendy Poulsen
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRl~J, ~QUBiTn~

~1tutLI

IN AND FoR wAsmNGToN coUNTiJrs¥ltE
5·;1.n Ul S i .<' J C;., ;,.. r~
s i. td::. i~; rt~ t.
. .

TO:

Judge Jeffrey C. Wilcox

Case No.
Plaintiff:

-·(~r-

1

100503405
KTM Health Care, Inc.

vs.

Defendant:

John Howard Albrecht

On the 13 th day of May, 2016, a Request to Submit for Decision was filed by Gary R. Guelker,
Attorney for Defendants.
8

The following motions are submitted for decision:
□

PLA's
□ PLA's
□ PLA's
□ PLA's

COURT'S RULING:

□

DEF's
□ DEF's
□ DEF's
181 DEF's

Motion for Summary Judgement
Motion for Judgement on the Pleadings
D Dismiss D Compel
Motion to:
Other: Motion for New Trial

__ S

D Continue

earing
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CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the following
people for case 100503405 by the method and on the date specified.

MAIL:
MAIL:
MAIL:
MAIL:

GARY R GUELKER 747 ES
JUSTIN D HEIDEMAN 2696
JANET I JENSON 747 ES
JEDEDIAH J STRONG 6028
05/31/2016

TEMPLE ST STE 130 SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84102
N UNIVERSITY, AVE STE 180 PROVO UT 84604
TEMPLE STE 130 SALT LAKE CITY UT 84102
S RIDGELINE DR STE 203 OGDEN UT 84405

/s/ JAMIE PERKES

Date:
Deputy Court Clerk

Printed: 05/31/16
10:36:18
Digitized by
the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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C)
C)
EXPENSES INCURRED PREPA'3ING KOLOB CONTRACT
1

-

FIXTURES: $2069.00
PHARMACY SOFTWARE (Rx30): $2996.83
PHARMACY.COMPUTER: $785.37

...
..
...

PHARMACY REFRIGERATOR: $282.63
DEA REGISTRATION: $551.00
LONG-TERM CARE MANUALS: $417.14
ALARM SYSTEM (PEAK ALARM): $400.00 (Price split between 2 pharmacies)
STATE BOARD (DOPL) FEES: $300.00
EMPLOYEE T-RAtNING (he was later dismissed due to lack of work): $12,723.67
GERIMED (GPO) PAPERWORK: $400.00 (4 hours by Adam ~crtschke)
.. THIRD PARTY CONTRAOlNG (!NSURA~CE): ~12()0.Q9 {12 hou~ by Adam Katschk~}
KOLqB STAFF MEETIN~S: $80Q.qp (8 h~urs by {\cjarr.f Kat~~~ke)
- KOi.OB CONTRACT PREPARATIQ~; ~400.00'(12 h9qrs_by A~fam Katschke and 12 hours
by Lane Truman)
.·
· · · ·' · ·
:..
': · ·
~

LT~ TRAINING IN WASHINGTON, D(!: $.1240~00 (1 day by Adam Katschke and travel
expense)
PHONE CALLS-TO COURIER SERVICE, WALGREENS, ETC: $500.00 (S hours by Lane
Truman) ·
PHARMACY REMODEL:
o Framil'}g: $1154.25 to Brent Atkinson
o Drywall: $1200.00 to Keith West
o Shelves/Cabinets/Painting: $982.65 to Landon Thomas
o Electrical.Supplies: $500.00 (supplied by Lane Truman)
o Electrical Labor: $400.00 (20 hours by lane Truman)
o Painting SuppJies: $400.00 (supplied by Lane Truman)
o Painting Labor: $400.00 (20 hours by Lane Truman and Adam Katschke)
o Fixture Installation~ $400.00 (20 hours by Lane Truman and Adam Katschke)
o Finish
Carpentry labor: $800.00 {40 hours by Lane Truman)
I

TOTAL CC;lST: $33,302Ji4

KTM0350
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EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT

of '

2010,

This agreement dated thi_s / l-i!,. day
L/pc 1 /
•
by and between Meadow Valley
Pharmacy (employer) and Trent K. Decker - pharmacist (employee).
TERMS

Employer shall pay employee and employee agrees to accept from employer, as full payment for
employees services hereunder, compensation at the rate of $45.00/hour, for a 40-hour week, t.o be paid
bi-weekly. Employee will be given a 2010 Volkswagon Jetta TDI for personal use as a bonus. The Jetta
will remain the personal property of the pharmacy owner but wlll be registered in the name of both

Adam Katschke and Trent Decker. The employee will pay for insurance and maintenance of the Jetta.

Employee will be given four weeks of paid vacation during the first year of employment. after the first
three months of employment (Time off requests must be submitted to employer and are subject to
approval by employer.}

~

Employee agrees to a 40-hour workweek an'd agrees to work the daily schedule given him by employer,
which may include, but Is not limited to, Fridays and Saturdays. Any hours over 40 that employee works
fn a week will either be paid at the regular rate of $45jhour or given as comp time. Under the direction of
employer, employee shall perform duties that are customarily performed by a community/retail
pharmacist

Employee agrees to work for a period of atleast36 months. Employment starts the 1st day of May 2010.
The employee agrees not to directJy or indirectly compete in Lincoln County, Nevada, With the business of
employer and its successors during the period of employment and for a period of five years after
termination of employment, no matter the reason or cause for termination. Employee shall not own,
operate, manage, consult, or be employed in a business similar to or competitive with employer within
Lincoln County.

Employer agrees to offer health insurance to employee and his dependents. Employer will pay for 100%
of employee's medical Insurance premiums and will pay for 50% or less of dependents premium.
NONDISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION

Employee will not at any time, in any manner, either directly or Indirectly, divulge, disclose, or
communicate to any person, any information of any kind or nature concerning matters relating to or

con~~pl~ye~o::::loyees,~r~~
Trent K. Decker

Date

800 N Spring St Box 315, Caliente, NV 89008

):~D

4

Adam P. Katschke, owner
(775) 726-3771ph

Date

(775) 726·368Sfx

pharmacynw@a;mail.com

f \JJEFENDAN'f's
1~
EXHIBIT

Meadow Valley Pharmacy

., 0
\
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